ABSTRACT Internet of Vehicles (IoV) incorporates environmental entities and networks for information exchange and service provisioning in road-side communications. Smart vehicle-assisted communications are exposed to higher risks as they communicate using wireless medium. Denial of service (DoS) types of attack gain control over the wireless medium to isolate resources and services to the end users. Reputationbased vehicle-assisted communication (RVAC) proposed in this paper mitigates the DoS attack by using global and local dependences of the vehicles. Global and local dependences are modeled by observing the transmission attributes associated with the vehicles. To ease adversary mitigation, the process of assessing vehicle attributes and decision-making is distributed across three tiers, categorized in the IoV architecture. The central authority (CA) works in a co-operative manner with the road-side units (RSUs) to ensure only legitimate vehicles participated in the communication process. The efficiency of the proposed RVAC is assessed and verified through the extensive simulation results. The RVAC performance is evaluated based upon detection time, communication loss, delay, false positive factor, and vehicle selection. The impact of vehicle density and adversary ratio is considered in the performance evaluation. The experimental results illustrate that the proposed RVAC retains a highly reputed vehicle selection rate with fewer false positives, less communication loss, and shorter communication delay and detection time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have emerged as an active research field that is gaining popularity in academic and industrial society [1] . A vehicle works as a communicating agent to establish connection between other vehicles. The connected vehicles form a network that provides different applications [2] , [3] . The communication link between neighboring vehicles is established if they within range of each other. The participating vehicle is connected to the internet for sharing, accessing, and storing information. This facilitates diverse services like vehicle internet, interand intra-vehicular communications, etc. [4] , [5] . VANETs are an extended form of mobile ad-hoc networks that are resource constrained by nature and possess limited processing capacity. This feature needs to be addressed to handle of traffic information, road assistance, environmental pollution information, emergency services, email communications, etc. Smart cities adapt the network intelligence to improve the quality of road-side assistance and information exchange. IEEE has defined IEEE1609/ WAVE standard for IoV communication. This standard supports two modes of operations: vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication and Infrastructure-to-vehicle (I2V) communication [13] . The vehicles accomplish user-level service and communication process using on-board units (OBUs) and user application interface (UAI). Communication and service requests are initiated through these units and are then carried forward to the road side units (RSUs) or access points (APs) [14] . The requests are forwarded in a multi-hop manner owing to the physical distance of separation between the vehicle and the infrastructure [15] - [18] . As all the communications are carried out in wireless medium, security related risks are high. False data injection is an instant security threat when communicating through a wireless medium. The risk of a security breach is high when relying upon anonymous neighboring vehicles. Authentication and trust of messages and vehicles becomes significant. Security provisioning methods must concentrate on minimizing the impact of adversaries on the vehicles and messages and on penalizing counterfeits [19] - [21] .
The adversaries influence legitimate information by flooding false information to instigate Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The attackers take control over the communicating links to interrupt active communications, increasing the level of DoS and curtailing successful communications. Vehicular communication networks with lesser latency and higher link utilization are prone to DoS, resulting in poor network performance [22] . This paper proposes a three-tier reputation based vehicle assisted communication (RVAC) scheme for detecting and penalizing DoS attacks. The proposed scheme identifies the discrepancy in vehicle behavior over time for both local and global dependencies. The misbehaving vehicles are penalized by detaining their communication until their next verification. The contributions of the paper are:
• Design of dedicated three-tier architecture for global behavior dependency verification. This architecture isolates operations at each level, reducing the burden of complex processing at each individual component and minimizing total processing time.
• Reputation-based vehicle selection for secure information dissemination among the anonymous neighbors. The anonymity in vehicular communication is streamlined to detect precise communication paths. This reputation also facilitates mitigation of false neighbors participating in communication. In this case, the vehicle behavior is analyzed at two levels for instant verification.
• Local verification process for retaining selfish vehicles from interrupting seamless communication. This is intended to improve the false detection rate in the network by minimizing communication loss. As the local verification process is employed, the time for detecting adversaries is substantially minimized.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section II briefs the works that were analyzed and proposed in the past. Section III describes the proposed methodology with its architecture and working process. The performance of the proposed methodology is discussed in Section IV with appropriate comparisons and descriptions. Section V presents the conclusion and future directions of the proposed method.
II. RELATED WORKS
Rawat et al. [23] present a data falsification attack detection mechanism to improve IoV network throughput. The adaptive contention window proposed in this work ensures less delay and more accurate information delivery to the neighbors. This detection method is based on clustering to minimize wait time of the vehicles and to decide contention window size. Puzzle-based co-authentication (PCA) [24] scheme mitigates DoS attacks in VANETs through a collaborative verification process. Lack of real-time information or delayed possession increases the time delay of PCA. A secure intelligent transportation system for IoV is proposed in [25] . The proposed security mechanism gains control over traffic signals to assist emergency vehicle movement. It minimizes the operations and storage of RSU through local information verification. To improve the intelligence of the communicating vehicles, Cognitive IoV [26] incorporates the benefits of a cognitive engine to IoV. Incorporating cognitive engine improves security measures of the network with less transmission delay, promising optimal path selection. Hierarchical Temporal Memory (HTM) framework [27] is employed to detect anomalies in the vehicular communication network. Specifically, this framework mitigates anomalies in the communication medium of the network. This method increases complexity over the gathered information and recursive states.
A two-level elliptic curve cryptography-based authentication technique [28] is introduced to improve smart vehicle communication security. The number of verification procedures attended by the certificate authority is not sufficient when the network observes higher vehicle density.
To ease the process of key distribution for heterogeneous vehicular networks, security manager assisted key management [29] has been proposed. This scheme defines dynamic key management and distribution using a block chain and dynamic communication allocation to minimize time expenditure during vehicle handoff.
In [30] , a crowd-sourced vehicular content-centric networking (CVCCN) framework is proposed to improve efficiency in content distribution. Identity-based proxy reencryption and named function networking are incorporated in this framework to improve security in content sharing and to preserve privacy of the vehicles. A dual authentication [31] scheme for securing V2V communication integrates security Mutually Obfuscating Paths (MOPs) [32] ensures location privacy of the vehicles. MOPs update vehicle location periodically and provide accurate positions to the location-based services (LBS) but prevent LBS from tracking the vehicles. Through branching, vehicles are likely to be invisible to LBS. To improve security in packet forwarding and downloading in highway vehicular networks, a secure incentive scheme is proposed [33] . Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signature is used to secure forwarding packets that are downloaded on request. Greedy detection for VANETs (GDVAN) [34] detects vehicles that exhibit greedy behavior at the time of communication. In GDVAN, behavior of the vehicles is supervised using three metrics: login attempts, connectivity endurance, and wait time. The process of GDVAN is prolonged when the number of routing loops in a vehicular network increases. This results in short-lived communication links.
The above discussion shows that communication in VANET requires scalability support to administer security over the increasing vehicle density. The increasing levels of communication increase delay with greater vehicle density. The authentication methods defined so far require direct evaluation of greedy behavior of the vehicles or are more complex. Therefore, an interoperable and mutual conceding architecture with specific independent operations is required to achieve shorter communication delay with better security.
This manuscript proposes an independent three-tier architecture where the components of each layer work independently to address security issues and provide participation authentication.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY A. NETWORK MODEL
The network model is shown in Figure 1 . The network is segregated into three tiers that are comprised of different components. Each component is equipped with independent functionalities that are co-operative for identifying adversaries and securing communication.
The components of each tier are explained with their functionalities below:
Tier 1: It consists of distributed communication, enabling components like Cloud Network (CN), Server (S), and Central Authority (CA). CN bridges RSU with CA and S components for storage, retrieval, and verification. CA is responsible for managing the vehicle-level characteristics observed in both local and global dependency. RSU signifies the reputation of the vehicles depending upon the stored information. CA is a distributed processing system that is more specific for validating vehicles by means of registration. It is coupled to storage to store registration information of the vehicles. CA also retrieves the stored information of the vehicle at the time of verification. The stored information is verified at the time of communication demand. Vehicles access information globally when the infrastructure-limited network does not meet demands. For global and distributed access to information and services, the cloud is incorporated into this network. The role of cloud in an IoV is of two ways: information sharing and storage and security verification. This feature is used in this manuscript as the CA does not permit a direct interaction for a self-organizing network like IoV.
Tier 2: Road Side Units and access points assisting vehicular communication are deployed in tier 2. Tier 2 components facilitate communications between vehicle and storage and other external networks, specifically cloud or grid. I2V mode of communication is pursued for establishing communication between tier 1 and 2. RSUs/APs administer control over vehicular communications and vehicle behavior to ensure secure communications.
Communication between tier 1 and 2 occurs through wireless links. The RSUs in tier 2 act as direct communicating access points to the upper tier. Therefore, additional infrastructure components are not necessary for communication.
Tier 3: OBU equipped vehicles constitute the components of tier 3. The vehicles act as actuators or sensors for sensing, gathering, transmitting, and receiving information from the environment. V2V mode of communication is pursued in tier 3.
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
In a DoS attack, the legitimate user is prevented from accessing the requested resource through incessant channel or link flooding. This creates the illusion that the requested resource will never be available for the user. In VANETs, DoS impacts communication in two stages: V2V and I2V. DoS operation in V2V and I2V is illustrated in Figure 2 (a) and 2(b), respectively.
1) V2V DOS
In a V2V DoS, the adversary floods the victim with replicated messages, keeping it busy all the time. As the victim vehicle is busy with the false message, it is disconnected from accessing the resource.
2) I2V DOS
In this case, the adversary launches a replicated message that floods the RSU. The RSU turns off its service response to the other legitimate vehicles, resulting in resource isolation.
In a DoS attack, the adversary vehicle is not required to possess greedy behavior. Its aim is to curtail resource availability for the demanding vehicles. The DoS attack contributes to unnecessary resource exploitation and network performance degradation.
C. REPUTATION BASED VEHICLE ASSISTED COMMUNICATION (RVAC)
In RVAC, the impact of DoS is mitigated through rigorous vehicle behavior verification. RVAC is made up of three phases: Set-up, Verification, and Participation. Vehicular communication is initiated after the set-up phase. Vehicles avoiding the set-up phase are discarded from communication by the RSU. Figure 3 illustrates the process of RVAC.
1) SET-UP PHASE
In the set-up phase, the vehicles register themselves with the CA, providing their registration number and unique Vehicle Identification Number (VIN). Upon receiving the information from the vehicles, the CA provides an eligible message (EM) for each vehicle. Using this EM, the vehicles can participate in communications. The EM needs to be updated to the nearest CA at periodic intervals; this update is prominent in determining the legitimacy of the vehicle as its position changes with time. It is not feasible for a vehicle to update the EM to the registered CA located a long distance away. As the CAs are interconnected, the vehicle updates the EM to its nearest CA. The CA updates the information to the cloud, allowing other CAs to access the vehicle's information. If the vehicle is moving within range of the other CAs, the vehicle can retrieve the information from the cloud storage. The EM format is as illustrated in Figure 4 . The possible cases that eliminate a vehicle at the initial stages are:
1. If the R_ID field of EM is empty, or VIN of a new registering vehicle already exists in the CA storage. 2. CID is mismatched, or a false CID is produced by the vehicle, at the time of verification. After the registration phase, the central authority initiates a broadcast to the other CA and RSUs within range. The CAs are distributed based on physical distance. To forward the information about the registered vehicle, the CA announces the information through a broadcast. The infrastructures and other CA present within the range of the broadcasting CA update the information for further reference and verification. The broadcast is internally signed by the CA and carries the EM of newly registered and existing vehicles. The EM of existing vehicles is updated for their RV, time, and CID, and the same is broadcasted to the tier 2 components. Earlier elimination of vehicles in the verification phase minimizes the time spent for vehicle level analysis. This improves the feasibility of pursuing secure communications. Elimination of vehicles is based on physical factors such as R_ID, VIN, and CID of the vehicle and central authority.
2) VERIFICATION PHASE
In the verification phase, the reputation of the vehicles is computed to confirm their eligibility to participate in communication. The reputation of the vehicle is dependent on its transmission attributes. The vehicle's number of qualified interactions is considered for computing the reputation of a vehicle v. The reputation of a vehicle can be accessed through direct and indirect communications pursued by the vehicle. In this case, estimation of indirect communication attributes is declined, as the adversary location is not known. Consider a vehicle v i computes the reputation of its direct neighbor v j . The reputation r(t, i, j) at a time t for n interaction is estimated as
where ϕ t−t n is the interaction weight and ϕ t−t n ∈ (0, 1). A vehicle is deemed legitimate if it satisfies equation (1), indicating it can participate in communication. The reputation of the vehicle is computed based on its connectivity with its direct neighbor. The reputation is estimated by computing the vehicle's interaction with and response to its neighbor. Equation (1) is defined to discard a vehicle from communication at the initial state.
C R is the communication range of a vehicle and d is the distance between two vehicles. The quantity of successful interactions decides the reputation of the vehicle over time. Successful interaction of a vehicle, in turn, relies on the forwarding factor ( f ) of a vehicle. If i f and i t are the count of information forwarded and transmitted, the forwarding factor of a vehicle can be computed using equation (3) .
Here, i f is the information forwarded by the vehicle undergoing assessment, and i t is the information transmitted by the communicating vehicle. The standard reputation (∅r) of a vehicle over a time (t + ∇t) is estimated using equation (4)
This standard reputation is the global dependency that is updated by the RSU/CA to the RV field of the vehicle's EM. The update is given to the vehicle depending on its position, whether it is near the CA or near the RSU. Either of the RV estimations is updated in a mutual manner. The most recent update is valid for the vehicle over time.
Analysis 1:
The information forwarded at time t is not the same as that forwarded at time (t +x) i.e., i f (t) = i f (t +x). ∅r is subjected to change, constructing an erroneous RV over the vehicle.
Report 1: If the above case is true, then vehicles possessing higher reputation would needlessly be prohibited from participating in the communication process. In this case, the CA in tier 3 incorporates more functions to create an additive authentication method. The functionalities are required to distinguish secure neighbors from the real adversaries. The additive authentication metric requires a series of history regarding VIN, extracting RV and time fields. The reputation of a legitimate vehicle is retained using this analysis. The initial RV check eliminates the adversary if its reputation is less at time (t + x) compared to t. Therefore, the discrepancy needs to be evaluated to identify the real adversary. The CA evaluates the persistent accuracy metric (C a ) for reviewing the RV of a vehicle. The minimum and maximum discrepancy of C a is estimated using the RV difference over time. Let µ min and µ max be the minimum and maximum discrepancy of observed in a vehicle's EM; µ min < C a < µ max is the ideal condition. There are two cases qualifying a vehicle for selection or discarding. If the accuracy metric is much smaller than the minimum discrepancy (C a µ min ), or vice versa, then the vehicle is deemed capable of participating in communication, r (t, i, j) = true. In contrast, if the accuracy metric is too large or exceeds the maximum discrepancy (i.e. C a µ max ), the vehicle is discarded and r (t, i, j) = 0. Here,
In this equation, the minimum and maximum discrepancy estimated using accuracy metric is calculated. The accuracy metric for 'n' transmission through the first transmission is used to find the minimum and maximum discrepancy of the vehicle's EM. Equation (5) is satisfied if the discrepancy metric satisfies, C a = ∅r (t) − ∅r(t + 1).
3) PARTICIPATION PHASE
In the participation phase, the vehicles are intended to establish communication through dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) and 802.11p integration. The vehicles are initially unaware of their neighbors. The newly registered vehicles initiate a broadcast with their VIN to discover their neighbors. The neighbors that receive the request acknowledge it with their EM. In the preliminary verification stage, a vehicle that does not acknowledge with its EM is neglected. If the vehicle receives its neighbor's EM, it finds the RV and CID of the broadcasting vehicle. The vehicle selects a neighbor with a higher RV to which it will transmit information. The OBU attached to the communicating vehicle updates the number of transmitted messages (i t ) to the RSU. The RSU holds the list of active neighbors in its local storage, verifying integrity as it awaits the i f from the neighbor. On receiving i f , it estimates the RV of the vehicle and forwards it to the CA. The CA stores the RSU-updated RV to the EM of the vehicle. The CA estimates the discrepancy factor of the active vehicle once it receives the next update from the communicating vehicle. The discrepancy estimation continues until the active session of the vehicle is closed or the vehicle moves out of range of the current RSU. These processes are restricted in tier 1 and 2, in which vehicles are prevented to perform this complex evaluation process. Similarly, if the vehicle position changes, the existing verification phase does not hold. Therefore, a new verification needs to be initiated by the CA based on the history of the vehicle. In this scenario, communication is delayed, and another neighboring vehicle is selected to pursue the lagging communication.
Analysis 2:
The C R of a selfish vehicle need not be the same as other vehicles. In such a scenario, the visibility of an adversary is not known (Refer to Figure 5 ). These vehicles have two chances to spoil the communication: availability of the vehicle is not ensured, and reputation of a vehicle is neither faded nor updated.
Report 2:To discard selfish vehicles from participating in the communication process, the communicating vehicle estimates its path reputation (r path ). If a vehicle forwards its request to its neighbor, then the request reputation (r req ) is estimated using equation (6) r req = r req + r (t, i, j)
The vehicles use an EM to acknowledge the requesting vehicles. If a vehicle generates a response, then f = 1, and the current reputation of a vehicle (r curr ) can be computed using equation (7) r curr = r curr + r (t, i, j) The vehicle communicates in response to the requesting vehicle's request. If the vehicle is found to exceed the time stamp of the route reply, then it is discarded and f = 0. Letting the vehicle v be connected to the RSU through more than one neighbor makes it likely to possess multiple paths to RSU. Therefore, the path reputation is estimated using equation (8) 
where v i is the available vehicles in i ts path and m is the total number of available paths. The estimation of path reputation includes all the available vehicles that are in range of each other. Letting n denote the number of vehicles between the active vehicle and RSU, the number of sequential r path estimation required is n-1. Density of the vehicle is subject to change and therefore, the reputation of the path is likely to vary. Estimating the number of vehicles participating in the communication path ensures proper computation of the reputation of the path. The considered path vehicles must lie in the communication range of each other, such that the communication is forwarded by the secured vehicles. This case is analyzed as follows. Consider a scenario as in Figure 5 . Now, the number of path vehicles (p v ) is estimated at a time t to identify the number of vehicles participating in tier 2 and 3 communications.
r path is computed for all p v in the path. If the scenario in Figure 5 is true, then vehicles at the current time, verified with the number of vehicles satisfying f = 1, is the local dependency of the vehicle at the time of verification.
4) GLOBAL DEPENDENCY UPDATE
The global dependency update relies on standard reputation (Equation (4) Figure 6 . The personal experience time (tv exp ) of the vehicle with its neighbor is estimated over the active session time between them. The experience time inspired from [34] is estimated using equation (11) 
where d (v1, v2) = |xv1 − xv2| 
where 0 < γ < 1 is an incremental factor. The reputation experience of the vehicle v 1 is proportional to the f (v2); the ∅r (v2) shows some variation as the vehicles are separated by uneven distances and the number of interactions per vehicle differs. In this case, the CA modifies the RV in EM using individual vehicle experience analysis. There are two cases to be analyzed in the global dependency update as briefed below:
Case 1:If the observed accuracy metric is greater than the vehicle experience and standard reputation difference i.e. C a > (r exp(v1→v2) −∅r).
If the discrepancy in the periodic update (t and t +1) differs greatly with respect to (tv exp + x), then the local update of the vehicle is true. This means that the forwarding vehicle is situated closer to the communicating (as well as evaluating) vehicle. The above inconsistency of the forwarding vehicle can be discarded until C a µ max and r exp(v1→v2) (t+x) < C a . The local dependency update of the vehicle is performed at periodic intervals, whereas the global reputation update is performed only if another neighbor comes within the minimum possible non-colliding distance of the forwarding vehicle. The risk of adversary interruption is likely to occur between (t + z) , z = x and t < z < x. In this case, the interactions of the vehicles at the time interval z must be undertaken at the own risk of the forwarding vehicles.
Case 2: C a ≤ (r exp(v1→v2) − ∅r), then the forwarding vehicle satisfies µ min ≤ a and the vehicle is said to be reputed in both global and local dependencies. The vehicles fitting into case2 are considered more secure for communication. The vehicle communication is verified by both local neighbors and the CA; therefore, this case is considered better than other cases. In this case, r path remains the same throughout constant p v and r curr . If these factors are constant, then C a → 0, which represents the ideal condition.
The process of the global dependency update is given in Algorithm 1.
The symbol ''::'' is used to denote v2 mapped with v1 i.e. v2 communicates with v1.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this session, the performance of the proposed RVAC is validated through extensive simulations carried out in Vehicular Network Open Simulator. This simulator aids modeling of DSRC and WAVE technologies with the integration of different networks and their services. The proposed RVAC is compared with the existing HTM [27] , GDVAN [34] , and PCA [24] techniques.
The simulation setup is modeled in a 1000m x 100m urban area with 50 vehicles and 7 infrastructure units.
Algorithm 1 Global Dependency Update Process
Input: The considered urban area is modeled with limited vehicles, where the interference is high. The vehicles adopt random velocities and are free to move in random directions in a Manhattan Model. Table 2 shows the simulation parameters used in the simulation.
A. IMPACT OF VEHICLE DENSITY
The increase in vehicle density influences network performance with respect to time and collision. The number of requests and services provided increases the response time from the above tiers. To address the collision and time delay, vehicular requests are processed with timespecific constraints using dependency updates. Uncontrolled vehicular requests due to increasing density would lead to communication loss and prolonged wait time for the endusers. Figure 7 portrays the detection time of adversaries in the network. The initial detection time in the proposed RVAC is high due to unknown acquaintances. The registered vehicles are the only available reputed vehicles for performing communication with local dependencies. In RVAC, a vehicle is said to be reputed if it qualifies both global and local dependencies. With the local dependency of accuracy metric greater than the observed experience and standard reputation difference, C a > r exp(v1→v2) −∅r is true when detection is restricted to a single transmitting vehicle. When vehicle density increases, the number of communication links is high and v i increases in ∅r (equation (4)), aiding accurate computation of vehicle reputation with C a . Similarly, given these two independent factors, tv exp for all path vehicles p v with updated current reputation r curr is necessary to pursue communication. The vehicles able to communicate are filtered from the initial population, wherein the vehicles that do not satisfy either of the conditions are detained. The time taken for initial detection is distinguishably less, whereas the post process requires additional time until the C a and r exp of the vehicles are precisely estimated. Once estimated, time for detecting adversary is less, as the process need not be repeated.
1) DETECTION TIME COMPARISON

2) COMMUNICATION LOSS COMPARISON
The comparison of communication loss between the existing methods and the proposed RVAC is illustrated in Figure 8 disqualified if they are found to be illegitimate, making it so the associated links and communication paths are restored with legitimate vehicles in range. Most probably, the nearest vehicles are opted for pursuing communication. In RVAC, the eligibility of the vehicles is assessed in the registration, verification and participation stages. This helps to minimize the influence of multiple adversaries over a single communication. Given that the detection of adversaries is carried out from the initial stage, it is less likely for adversaries to be present in later stages of communication. The newly replaced neighbors must satisfy the accuracy lies between the minimum and maximum discrepancy, i.e. µ min < C a < µ max , to pursue communication.
B. IMPACT OF ADVERSARIES
The impact of adversaries in a formal communication degrades the quality and service intention of the network. In a decentralized vehicle-assisted communication network, adversary detection and mitigation improves the stability of communication by differentiating legitimate vehicles. This classification is important for retaining communication and securing neighbor selection without conceding to delay. Figure 9 illustrates the comparison of delay between the existing methods (HTM, GDVAN, and PCA) and the proposed RVAC. In RVAC, the eligibility of a vehicle to participate in communication is verified on two levels, based on EM information and dependencies of the vehicle. The vehicles failing in either of the verification constraints are detained from initiating or participating in communication. Therefore, the additional time required for path reinforcement and retransmitting information to the RSU is not required. Thus, the transmission delay due to adversary vehicles between communications is less. When accuracy is high, i.e. C a > (r exp(v1→v2) −∅r), the possibility of delay occurrence is high in the interval (t + z) , thus adding the difference (z − t) ms to delay. When C a → 0 or C a ≤ (r exp(v1→v2) − ∅r), then delay due to an adversary is almost 0, and does not impact the transmission.
1) DELAY COMPARISON
2) FALSE POSITIVE FACTOR COMPARISON
False positive factor (FPF) is the approximate communication error in the assessment of CA when it falsely identifies an adversary as a legitimate vehicle.
FPF in RVCA is initially high due to the limited communication links and vehicle acquaintances. Unlike the conventional neighbor selection scheme, the neighbors are permitted to pursue communication if they have registered and qualify for the CA examination. In such a verification scenario, the visibility of the neighbors requires some time until the impact of adversaries is high. After the examination process, legitimate neighbors are identified through EM broadcast at the initial stage. In the later stage, based on the behavior attributes of the vehicles, CA computes ∅r and C a of each vehicle through global and local dependencies. Therefore, the number of vehicles capable of communication is filtered based on vehicle reputation. This process is recursive, using the physical attributes of the vehicle such as distanced and p v . Both ∅r constrained with accuracy C a and path reputation r path control the impact of adversaries over the network post neighbor visibility and CA verification. Therefore, selection of illegitimate vehicles is impeded and FPF is minimized (Refer to Figure 10 ).
3) REPUTED VEHICLE SELECTION RATIO
Selection of legitimate vehicles in an IoV improves the reliability of services provided for which the selection needs to be accurate. In the proposed RVAC, the communication enabling vehicle (forwarding) is selected through its behavior attributes, assessed at both global and local dependencies. In the existing trust models, selection of neighbors depends on local attributes. RVAC considers both the implicit (transmission attributes) and explicit (physical attributes) factors for neighbor selection. The explicit attributes have direct impact over the transmission ability of the vehicles, resulting in dependency variance. The proposed RVAC justifies the selection of vehicle over varying distance with vehicle experience tv exp and reputation r exp(v1→v2) . The personal experience of each vehicle is determined based on distance to justify neighbor selection after the initial selection. This allows legitimate vehicles to participate in communication, retaining a higher selection ratio than the other methods (Refer to Figure 11 ).
V. CONCLUSION
This manuscript proposes an RVAC design for evading DoS adversaries in IoV. The detection and mitigation process are carried out by assessing the reputation of the vehicles using their communication attributes. The attributes are evaluated at two tiers to minimize the computation complexity at the RSU. The CA is responsible for determining the reputation of a vehicle with proper recommendation discrepancy evaluation and reputation update. Along with the vehicle registering process, the CA estimates the reputation of the vehicle to participate in communication, restraining selfish and DoS sources interrupting the communication. The proposed RVAC was found to be effective against the adversary, as proven through extensive analysis. In the future, the work is planned to extend its support to provide vehicle level message authentication. The authentication scheme must be a light-weight process that does not increase the communication complexity.
